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Policing the Police:
The Status of Inunigration Checks in the
Context of Rodriguez v. United States
Vaishalee Yeldandit

I. INTRODUCTION

A recent Supreme Court decision has the potential to change how
local and state law enforcement entities enforce immigration laws. In
Rodriguez v. United States,' the Court examined whether police could
prolong an otherwise-completed traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff
absent reasonable suspicion. 2 The Court held that a "police stop
exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was
made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures."3
Various courts across the country have relied on Rodriguez to decide
cases beyond traffic stops and dog sniffs, including "stop and frisks" and
ex-felon registration checks.4
Arizona v. United States5 partially upheld an Arizona state law
requiring local law enforcement to make reasonable attempts to
determine an individual's immigration status if reasonable suspicion
exists that he or she is unlawfully present in the United States. 6 In the
aftermath of Rodriguez, how should local and state officers approach
immigration enforcement in the context of law enforcement stops? After
the Department of Homeland Security repealed its own Secure
Communities
Program,
an immigration
enforcement
program
administered from 2008 to 2014, and implemented its replacement, the

t B.A. 2006, Cornell University; M.S. 2008, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 2017,
The University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Aziz Huq for his guidance.
135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
Id. at 1612.

Id.
See Gus M. Centrone & Brian L. Shrader, The Dog Days Are over: Terry Stops, Traffic
Stops, and Dog Sniffs After Rodriguez, 62 FED. LAW. 46, 50 (2015).
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2507-10.
3
4
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Priority Enforcement Program (PEP),7 how should local law
enforcement interact with suspected undocumented immigrants during
traffic stops? What are the consequences for immigration enforcement
overall?
Under a broad interpretation of Rodriguez, this Comment argues
that even in 287(g) communities 8 or under the PEP, it should be
unconstitutional for local or state law enforcement to inquire into an
individual's immigration status during the course of a stop, absent
reasonable suspicion. As criminal convictions increasingly intersect
with immigration consequences, this interpretation of Rodriguez would
benefit law enforcement because it would provide a bright-line rule for
officers to follow. In addition, immigrant communities that have
traditionally avoided law enforcement for fear of being racially profiled
would benefit, as extending Rodriguez to the immigration context
would increase these communities' confidence in and cooperation with
officers.
This Comment applies Rodriguez to examine the viability of
prohibiting immigration status checks during law enforcement stops.
Part II provides background on one of the areas of the law that shapes
this topic: the evolution of law enforcement stops. Part III examines
how circuit courts have applied Rodriguez to cases beyond dog sniff
searches and traffic stops. Part IV provides background on the
immigration law, the second area of law that shapes this topic and
intersects with criminal law. In Part V, this Comment discusses why
extending a law enforcement stop to check an individual's immigration
status without reasonable suspicion should be unconstitutional under
Rodriguez. This Comment concludes by suggesting that an additional
way to comply fully with Rodriguez and avoid allegations of racial
profiling would be for Congress to pass immigration reform or
legislation directly aimed at ending racial profiling by law enforcement.
However, given the current political climate and congressional gridlock,
these reforms will likely not materialize in the near future. Thus, the
Court should implement a bright-line rule that extends Rodriguez to
prohibit inquiries into an individual's immigration status during the
course of a stop, absent reasonable suspicion.

Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Security, to Thomas S. Winkowski,
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 1-2 (Nov. 20,
2014), http:/Iwww.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120_memo secure-communities.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/4MBX-KRRR] (Department of Homeland Security memorandum explaining that
the Secure Communities Program would be replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program).
8 287(g) communities are those in which state and local law enforcement receive delegated
authority to enforce immigration laws. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration

and

Nationality

Act,

U.S.

IMMIGRATION

AND

CUSTOMS

http://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/ZEV8-8AZ3] (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
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II. BACKGROUND ON LAW ENFORCEMENT STOPS

This section provides a brief introduction to one of the two areas of
law that shape this Comment: law enforcement stops. It discusses the
evolution of traffic stops and other law enforcement stops, the relevance
of law enforcement's intent while stopping an individual, and the
limitations on law enforcement's ability to search.
A.

Traffic Stops, Terry Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
adopted in the face of intrusive searches conducted during the Colonial
era: 9
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons'
or things to be seized. 10
Although the Fourth Amendment guarantees that search warrants
will not be issued unless there is "probable cause," in practice, courts
have allowed law enforcement some leeway when it comes to
investigating individuals suspected of committing a crime.
Terry v. Ohio" is a landmark Fourth Amendment case because the
Court established law enforcement's use of the "reasonable suspicion"
standard, a lower standard than probable cause. 12 Reasonable suspicion
allows an officer without probable cause-but whose "observations lead
him reasonably to suspect" that an individual has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime-to briefly detain that person
to "investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." 13 The
Supreme Court held that when an officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him to reasonably conclude that there may be criminal
activity and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, the officer
is entitled to protect himself and others in the area by conducting a

' See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12
Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13 Centrone & Shrader, supra note 4, at 47 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 881 (1975)).
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"carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons" to
discover any hidden weapons that may be used in an assault. 14
Almost twenty years after Terry, the Supreme Court held in
Berkemer v. McCarty15 that "roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop" 16 is more akin to "a socalled 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest."17 As a result, lower courts
have taken the limitations imposed by Terry and subsequent cases and
applied them to cases alleging a Fourth Amendment violation during
routine traffic stops. 18
Relevance of an Officer's Motive when Detaining Individuals

B.

In Whren v. United States, 19 the Supreme Court examined the
relevance of a police officer's intent in temporarily detaining a
motorist. 2 0 The Court held that the traffic stop in question and
resulting seizure of drugs was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, because the officers had probable cause to believe the
defendants violated the District of Columbia's traffic code. 21 Although
the defendants conceded that the officer had probable cause to believe
the defendants had violated the traffic code, they argued that "in the
unique context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause was not
enough; the use of vehicles is so heavily regulated that complete
"compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible" and a
police officer will almost always be able to write up a motorist for a
violation. 22 This power could entice officers to use traffic stops as a way
to investigate other law violations, even where no probable cause or
articulable suspicion exists. 23 This was particularly problematic for the
defendants, who were both black, because they contended that police
officers might decide whom to stop based on "decidedly impermissible
factors, such as the race of the car's occupants." 24 However, the Court

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
16
Id. at 435.
17 Id. at 439.
18
See Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much
"Routine,"Not Enough FourthAmendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1862 (2004).
19 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
14

20

Id. at 808.
Id. at 819.

21
23
24

Id. at 810.
Id.
Id.
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stated that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis." 25
While the Court agreed with the defendants that the Constitution
forbids the selective enforcement of the law based on factors such as
intentionally
basis
for
challenging
race,
the
constitutional
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not
the Fourth Amendment. 26 Whren's logic confirms that an officer may
pull a car over when the driver commits a traffic violation, even if the
officer's underlying motivation is to investigate some other crime. 27 The
case has been widely criticized for its perceived expansion of Terry and
for the "criminalization of 'driving while black."' 28 Thus, it is as though
the Court adopted a new standard-the "could have" standard: "[A]ny
time the police could have stopped the defendant for a traffic infraction,
it does not matter that the police actually stopped him to investigate a
crime for which the police have little to no evidence." 29
C.

Restraints on Law Enforcement's Ability to Search

While the previously discussed opinions expanded the power of law
enforcement during traffic stops, Knowles v. Iowa30 introduced
restraints upon an officer's ability to search a vehicle pursuant to a
traffic stop. An Iowa police officer stopped the defendant for speeding,
but elected to give him a citation rather than arresting him. 3 1
Afterwards, however, the officer conducted a full search of the
defendant's car. 3 2 The defendant was subsequently arrested on state
drug charges. 33
The defendant moved to suppress the obtained evidence, arguing
that the search did not fall under the "search incident to arrest"
exception, 34 because he had not been placed under arrest for the initial

"
26
2
28

Id. at 813.
Id.
See id. at 816-17.
Adrienne Arnold, Note, Rodriguez,

Terry, and the Supreme Court's Evolving Fourth

&

Amendment Jurisprudence: How Rodriguez Does (and Does Not) Clarify the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 6 HOUSTON L. REV. 135, 145-46 (2015).
29 Id. at 146 (emphasis in original) (quoting David A. Harris, 'Driving While Black' and All
Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997)).
so 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
3
32

Id. at 114.
id.

id.
I3
Id. at 116 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)) (noting that for the
search incident to arrest to be justified, the officer must have "(1) the need to disarm the suspect in
order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial.").
34
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traffic violation. 3 5 Although the police officer conceded that he did not
have the defendant's consent or probable cause to conduct the search,
he contended that Iowa laws sanctioned the search because Section
805.1(4)36 provided that issuing a citation instead of an arrest "does not
affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search," i.e.,
"a search incident to citation." 37 The Iowa Supreme Court interpreted
that provision to authorize officers to conduct "full-blown search[es]" of
a vehicle and driver in situations where the police issue a citation
instead of making a custodial arrest.3 8
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme
Court's decision, holding that the search did not fall under the search
incident to arrest exceptions: (1) officer safety, or (2) the need to
preserve evidence. 39 The defendant was not armed, and there was no
need to discover and preserve evidence since all the evidence necessary
to prosecute the traffic violation had been obtained once the citation
was issued. 40 Thus, the Court did not expand the Fourth Amendment
exceptions to situations where there was no concern for officer safety,
or the destruction or loss of evidence. 41
In Illinois v. Caballes,42 the Court examined the narrow issue of
"[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during
a legitimate traffic stop." 4 3 After the defendant was pulled over for
speeding on an interstate highway, another Illinois State Trooper
heard the report of the stop from police dispatch and headed to the
scene with a drug-sniffing dog." While the defendant was in the first
trooper's vehicle waiting for his ticket, the second officer walked the
dog around the defendant's car. 4 5 When the dog alerted at the trunk,
the officers searched the trunk, discovered marijuana, and arrested the
defendant. 46
The Supreme Court held that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess
*

Id. at 117-18.
IOWA CODE § 805.1(4) (2016).
37 Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115.
38

Id.

3

Id. at 117-18.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 118-19.

42

543 U.S. 405 (2005).

4

Id. at 407.

44
46

Id. at 406.
Id.

46

Id.
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does not violate the Fourth Amendment." 47 Although the Court held
that the search in Caballes was constitutional, it also noted the
parameters of searches. The Court remarked that "[a] seizure that is
justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver
can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete that mission." 8
In Arizona v. Johnson,49 the Supreme Court examined the
authority of police officers to stop and frisk a passenger in an
automobile, who was temporarily seized upon observation of a traffic
violation.5 0 Other than the traffic infraction, the "officers [in Arizona]
had no reason to suspect anyone in the vehicle of criminal activity. "51
While approaching the car, one officer noticed the defendant wearing
clothing considered to be consistent with membership in the Crips gang
and that the defendant had a police scanner in his jacket pocket. 52
The officer asked to question the defendant away from the front
seat passenger, and the defendant complied when the officer asked him
to step outside the car. 53 Because the officer suspected that the
defendant may have been armed, she "patted [the defendant] down for
officer safety[.]"5 4 The officer felt the butt of a gun near the defendant's
waist, and later charged the defendant with possession of a weapon by
a prohibited possessor.55 The Supreme Court held that "[an] officer's
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop .

.

. do not convert the encounter into something other than a

lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop."5 6 Under this standard, the Court upheld the pat
down in Johnson.57
D.

Setting the Boundaries of Traffic Stops

In Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court once again
revisited the constitutionality of traffic stops under the Fourth
Amendment by building upon the holdings in Caballes and Johnson. A
police officer pulled the defendant over after observing the defendant

47

o

Id. at 410.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.

52

Id. at 328.

5

Id.

54

Id.

Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
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veer onto the highway shoulder, a traffic violation.5 8 After the officer
gathered the defendant's license, registration, and proof of insurance,
he asked the defendant to accompany him to the police car. 5 9 When the
defendant asked if he was required to do so, the officer responded that
he was not and the defendant remained in his own vehicle.6 0 After
completing the records check on the defendant, the officer asked the
defendant's passenger for his license and questioned the passenger on
his travel plans.6 1
The officer completed a records check on the passenger and called
for a second officer. 62 The officer then returned to the defendant's
vehicle for a third time to serve a written warning for the traffic
violation. 63 He then asked for permission to walk his dog around the
defendant's vehicle. 64 The officer testified that although he had
"got[ten] all the reason[s] for the stop out of the way," he did not
consider the defendant "free to leave."65 When the defendant denied
permission to walk the dog around the vehicle, the officer instructed
the defendant to exit the vehicle and stand in front of the patrol car
until a second officer arrived. 66 After the second officer arrived, the first
officer led the dog around the defendant's vehicle and the dog alerted to
the presence of drugs; a search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of
methamphetamine. 67 Approximately seven to eight minutes elapsed
between when the officer issued the written warning and when the dog
alerted to the presence of drugs.68
The defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, contending
that the first officer "had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable
suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff." 69 The Magistrate Judge
recommended that the motion be denied.7 0 Although he found no
probable cause to search the car other than the dog alert or reasonable
suspicion to support the defendant's detention once the written
warning had been issued, he concluded that prolonging the stop by
"seven to eight minutes" for the dog sniff was only a de minimis
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
" Id. at 1613.
6 Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

6

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.
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intrusion of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and, therefore,
was permissible under Eighth Circuit precedent.7 1
Based on the Magistrate Judge's factual finding and legal
conclusions, the District Court denied the defendant's motion to
suppress, relying on the same Eighth Circuit precedent. 72 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the "seven- or eight-minute delay" in this
case resembled delays that it had previously decided were permissible.
Thus, the seven-to-eight minute time period was an acceptable de
minimis intrusion on the defendant's personal liberty. 73
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split between
lower courts on whether police may regularly "extend an otherwisecompleted traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct
a dog sniff."7 4 The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling, holding
that, although an officer may conduct unrelated checks during an
otherwise lawful stop, she may not do so in such a way that extends the
length of the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion typically required to
justify detaining a suspect.75
Based on the precedent it set in cases like Caballes and Johnson,
the Court noted that, like a Terry stop, "the tolerable duration of police
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's
'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and
attend to the related safety concerns." 76 In addition, beyond deciding
whether to issue a traffic citation, an officer's mission includes
"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop," like checking the
driver's license, checking for outstanding warrants on the driver, and
examining the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance."7 7 Checking
these documents and databases serves the same purpose as enforcing
the traffic code-ensuring that automobiles on the road are operating
safely and responsibly.7 8

Id. (citing United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 1613-14 (quoting Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1016) ("[D]og sniffs that occur within
a
short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibited if they
constitute only de minimis intrusions.").
7
Id. at 1614.
71

72

74

id.

Id. at 1615. On remand, the Eighth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule exception,
present in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011), did not apply in the defendant's
7

case. The circumstances of Davis's seizure fell directly within the Circuit's case law and the search
was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on the Circuit's precedent; thus the court

affirmed the defendant's conviction. See United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d 1222, 1224 (8th Cir.
2015).
76
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (emphasis added).
n Id. at 1615 (citations omitted).
78
Id.

916

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

Rather than addressing safety concerns, a dog sniff is aimed at
identifying evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 79 The Court noted that a
dog sniff would not be fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic
mission because it does not have the same close connection to road
safety as document and database checks do.s0 While recognizing that
traffic stops are particularly fraught with danger to police officers and
thus an officer may need to take "certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely," on-scene
investigation of other crimes "detours from that mission."8 1 Thus, a dog
sniff cannot be justified on the same basis as other safety precautions
because "[h]ighway and officer safety are interests different in kind
from the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general or drug
trafficking in particular."8 2 Although the Supreme Court clarified that
the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is
determined by the seizure's mission-and in this context a dog sniff
search did not qualify-the Court provided no clear guidance as to what
qualifies as part of the seizure's mission.
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPLICATION OF RODRIGUEZ
In cases applying Rodriguez where law enforcement had prior
knowledge of alleged criminal activity, "the interaction can move
forward, and the search will be upheld." 8 3 For example, in United States
v. Zuniga,84 the Sixth Circuit held that law enforcement was justified in
extending the traffic stop for a dog sniff because the officer had
reasonable suspicion based on an FBI wiretap, the defendant's
implausible travel plans, and the defendant's uneasiness when asked
for his insurance card and driver's license.85
Although federal courts have not yet addressed immigration checks
in the context of Rodriguez, circuit courts have expanded its holding to
cases beyond dog sniff searches during traffic stops. For example, in
United States v. Evans,86 the Ninth Circuit relied on Rodriguez to hold
that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he prolonged the
traffic stop to conduct an ex-felon registration and dog sniff.8 7 The court
noted that after stopping the defendant, the officer conducted "ordinary

so

Id.

81

Id. at 1616.
id.

82
8

84

Centrone & Shrader, supra note 4, at 50.
613 F. App'x 501 (6th Cir. 2015).

"' Id. at 507-08.
96 786 F.3d 779 (9th Cir.
2015).
87
Id. at 780-81.
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inquiries incident to the traffic stop," i.e., checking the vehicle records
and outstanding warrants.8 8 After completing those record checks,
however, the officer then requested an ex-felon registration check of the
defendant, which the court found to be "wholly unrelated" to the
officer's "mission" of ensuring that vehicles on the road are operating
safely and responsibly.8 9
The court was not concerned when the ex-felon registration check
occurred during the seizure, but instead whether the check added time
to the stop. 90 Here, the ex-felon registration check took about eight
minutes, i.e., almost half of the duration of the traffic stop prior to the
dog sniff, and the court noted that this check did not advance officer
safety (the officer conducted the check after he told the defendant that
he would not be cited for the traffic violation).9 1 On remand, the district
court found that the officer had unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop
for the ex-felon registration check without independent reasonable
suspicion. 92
Similarly, the Second Circuit applied Rodriguez in United States v.
Watson, 93 a case involving a police officer searching for a robbery
suspect neither during a traffic stop nor during a dog sniff.94 The officer
initially stopped Watson because he believed that the defendant looked
similar to their suspect. 95 Even though the defendant produced valid
identification proving that he was not the suspect in question, the
officer proceeded to search him and discovered a weapon and bags of
crack cocaine. 96 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence from the arrest, which the Second Circuit upheld.
Citing Rodriguez, the Second Circuit held that law enforcement's
"[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied" to the reason for
the stop "are-or reasonably should have been-completed": in this
case, determining whether Watson was the robbery suspect."97 In other
words, once the officer had confirmation that Watson was not the
robbery suspect, the stop should not have been extended to search him.
Thus, Evans and Watson suggest that Circuit Courts of Appeals
view Rodriguez as applicable to cases beyond those involving the
m
8

9

Id. at 786.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 786-87.
9
United States v. Evans, 122 F. Supp. 3d. 1027, 1037-38 (D. Nev. 2015), appeal dismissed
(Sept. 16, 2015).
3
787 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2015).
" Id. at 102.
95 Id.
96 Id.
Id. at 105 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)).
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validity of a dog sniff search. Furthermore, as Watson demonstrates,
Rodriguez can be applied to cases involving other types of law
enforcement stops, like Terry stops. These cases suggest that an officer
should conduct a stop based only upon his or her initial reasoning,
absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause that would justify
further inquiry. 98
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT,
AND DEPORTATION

Background on Immigration Law

A.

Although the United States has always been a nation of
immigrants, it has long struggled with the parameters of immigration
enforcement. The Constitution does not explicitly reference the ability
of the federal government to oversee the entry of foreigners, but, in the
Chinese Exclusion Case,99 the Supreme Court read Section 8 of Article I
to mean that "international migration is a form of international
commerce," establishing that Congress had the authority to set
immigration policy.100 The Court also held that the nature of
immigration enforcement is civil in nature, rather than criminal; thus
even immigrants who had been residents in the United States for a
long time could be detained or deported with little or no due process. 101
Since a deportation order is not punishment for a crime, a deported
immigrant has not been deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process. 102
As noted by the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 103 another critical
development in the area of immigration law has been the concurrently
expanding class of deportable offenses and the diminishing authority of
judges to alleviate the severe consequences of deportation. 104 The
Immigration Act of 1917 authorized the deportations of noncitizens
based on criminal conduct committed on American soil for the first
time. 105 That law also provided important protections to minimize the
risk of unjust deportations-within thirty days of a sentencing, the
sentencing judge in state and federal prosecutions had the power to

Centrone & Shrader, supra note 4, at 50.
9
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
100 Michael Kagan, Immigration Law's Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J.
125, 136 (2015).
'0' Id. at 138 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893)).
102
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
103
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
98

104

"o5

See id. at 360.
Id. at 361.
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recommend that the defendant not be deported, which effectively
prevented the deportation. 106 However, Congress eliminated this
judicial discretion in 1990 and went further to jettison the Attorney
General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation in
1996.107 In addition to the shrinking authority of the executive and
judicial branches to provide relief from deportation, Congress also
expanded greatly the number and types of offenses that would trigger
removal proceedings if committed by a noncitizen.10 8
Recently, the distinction between the civil and criminal
implications has begun to fade. 109 More than a hundred years after the
10 the
Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,o
Supreme Court examined the intersection of criminal law and
immigration enforcement and the consequences of that intersection. In
Padilla v. Kentucky, the petitioner faced a virtually mandatory
deportation because he relied on his attorney's erroneous advice that
his immigration status would not be affected if he pleaded guilty to
drug charges.1 1 ' Reversing the criminal conviction and remanding the
case, the Court held that attorneys must inform their clients when
pleading guilty carries the risk of deportation. 112
The Court recognized that, although a deportation is not in a strict
sense a criminal sanction, it is "intimately related to the criminal
process." 113 Since immigration law has been amended to trigger
removal for a wide range of noncitizen offenders, the Court found it
difficult to "divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation
context."1 14 Due to its close connection to the criminal process, it is
"uniquely difficult" to classify deportation as either a direct or collateral
consequence of a criminal conviction." 5
B.

The Fourth Amendment Rights of Non-Citizens

There is a binary system of Fourth Amendment rights of noncitizens, depending on where an individual is in relation to the nation's
borders. With a focus on combatting unlawful immigration and
contraband entering the United States, the Supreme Court created an
"

Id. at 361-62.

07

Id. at 363.

1os

Id. at 363-64.

109

See Kagan, supra note 100, at 146.

110

149 U.S. 698 (1893).

.. Padilla, 559 U.S. 359.
"
Id. at 374.
"" Id. at 365.
114
Id. at 366.
115

Id.
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exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches
and seizures that occur at the border and their functional
equivalents.1 1 6 Thus, routine examination without a warrant or
suspicion is presumed to be reasonable "simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border."1 17 At ports of entry, the Supreme Court
gives the government much more leeway with respect to what is
deemed to be a reasonable search and seizure. 1 s
But in theory, individuals apprehended within the interior of the
United States by local and state enforcement are entitled to full
protection under the Fourth Amendment, without regard to their
immigration status. 119 This view was reinforced in Arizona v. United
States. Although the Supreme Court held that most of the state laws
passed to address issues related to the number of undocumented
immigrants living in Arizona (S.B. 1070)120 were preempted, 121 it
declined to hold the section requiring state officers to make a
"reasonable attempt .

.

. to determine the immigration status" of any

individual they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if
"reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
unlawfully present in the United States" as facially unconstitutional. 122
In the context of Arizona v. Johnson and Illinois v. Caballes, the Court
expressed caution that the constitutionality of this section would be
questioned if individuals were detained solely to verify their
immigration status. 123
V. EXTENDING RODRIGUEZ TO PROHIBIT SUSPICIONLESS IMMIGRATION

STATUS CHECKS
Law enforcement confront a multitude of issues during a traffic or
Terry stop. As Rodriguez held, an officer may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful stop, but she may not do so by
prolonging the stop unless there is reasonable suspicion justifying the
detention of the individual. 124 Once an officer achieves the mission of
the stop, results from any search or inquiry cannot be considered by the

"1

See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-22
(1977).

"'
118

Id. at 616.

119

Id.

120

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.

Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 187 (2013).

2492 (2012).
121
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501-07.
122 Id. at 2507-10.
123 Id. at 2509.
12
See 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015).
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court absent some other independent and articulable suspicion. 125
Under this reasoning, checking an individual's immigration status
during a traffic stop is unrelated to the "mission" of the stop and thus
should not be allowed. The effects of a traffic citation as minor as a
broken tail light can have the domino effect of triggering immigration
removal proceedings for noncitizens who do not have criminal records.
Thus, it is crucial to determine if and when immigration checks are
part of the mission of a law enforcement stop.
A.

Relation of Immigration Status to the Mission of a Stop

The Rodriguez Court held that beyond deciding whether to issue a
traffic citation, an officer's mission includes "ordinary inquiries incident
to [the traffic] stop," like checking the driver's license, checking for
outstanding warrants on the driver, and examining, the vehicle's
registration and proof of insurance.1 26 The purpose of checking these
documents and databases serves the same purpose as enforcing the
traffic code-ensuring that vehicles on the road are operating safely
and responsibly.1 27
In addition, checking the immigration status of an individual
during a traffic stop parallels a dog sniff search-both would not be
fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission because they
do not have the same close connection to road safety as document and
database checks do.1 28 An invalid driver's license or fraudulent
document should raise reasonable suspicion of an individual being in
the country illegally and thus could trigger checking immigration
databases. However, in states where residents can apply for driver's
licenses and state identification regardless of immigration status,
extending a traffic stop for an immigration status check beyond any
reasonable suspicion should be unconstitutional under Rodriguez. In
those states, identification documents provide no probative value of
legal immigration status if immigration status is irrelevant to the
ability to obtain them. Currently, twelve states (as well as the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico) offer access to licenses, regardless of
immigration status.1 29 Presumably, in these states, if an individual has
valid identification, that should end any inquiry or suspicion of
undocumented immigration status.

125

id.

126

Id.

127

Id.

`8

See id.
Driver's Licenses Map, NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., https://www.nile.orgfissues/drivers-
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Furthermore, the immigration status of a person in and of itself
does not pose a safety risk to the officer. While the Rodriguez Court
recognized that traffic stops are particularly fraught with danger to
police officers and thus an officer may need to take "certain negligibly
burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely," onscene investigation of other crimes "detours from that mission." 130 Just
as a dog sniff cannot be justified on the same basis as other safety
precautions because "[h]ighway and officer safety are interests different
in kind from the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general or
drug trafficking in particular," 1 3 1 checking an individual's immigration
status also cannot be justified on the same basis as other safety
precautions.
Although the act of being present in the United States without
authorization violates immigration law, that does not suggest a further
propensity to commit serious crimes. First, most immigration violations
are handled by civil proceedings. Second, according to the American
Immigration Council (AIC), there is actually an inverse relationship
between crime and immigration. 132 Immigrants, whether they are here
legally or unauthorized, are less likely to commit serious crimes or be
imprisoned. 133 From 1990 to 2013, the foreign-born 34 percentage of the
population in the United States increased from 7.9 percent to 13.1
percent, and the number of unauthorized immigrants increased
dramatically from 3.5 million to 11.2 million. 135 During that same time
frame, FBI data shows that that the violent crime rate decreased 48
percent, including declining rates of aggravated assault, robbery, rape,
and murder. 136 Similarly, the property crime rate decreased 41 percent,
including falling rates of motor vehicle theft, larceny/robbery, and
burglary. 137 These trends hold steady for both cities that have
traditionally been viewed as "gateways" for immigrants (for example,
130

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.

1a1

Id.

Walter A. Ewing et al., The Criminalizationof Immigration in the United States, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL 4 (July 2015), http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/
[https://perma.cc/6RXMthe criminalization of immigration intheunitedstatesfinal.pdf
4F4V].
132

.. Id. at 3.
'
The AIC report relies on U.S. Census Bureau data, which refers to "foreign born" as anyone
who was not born a U.S. citizen, which includes naturalized U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
residents, temporary migrants (e.g., foreign students), humanitarian migrants (e.g., refugees and
asylees), and undocumented immigrants. "Native born" persons refer to individuals born in the
United States or one of its territories, or persons born abroad to at least one U.S. citizen parent.
See About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/population/foreign-born/
about.html [https://perma.cc/SU9K-RACQ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
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Miami, Chicago, El Paso, and San Diego), and for newer immigration
hubs such as Austin. 138
Critics could argue that comparing the foreign-born population to
the native-born population fails to account for the possibility that even
if foreign-born individuals commit less crime, it is possible that the
majority of those committing the crimes are undocumented. However,
an empirical study of the Secure Communities Program (S-COMM) 13 9
shows that deporting undocumented immigrants at a higher rate had
little to no effect on reducing crime rates. 140 Research showed that the
program failed to reduce meaningfully the FBI's overall index crime
rate and failed to reduce meaningfully the rate of any individual violent
offense, although modestly reduced the rate of two property crimes. 141
Furthermore, research suggests that "the marginal immigrant detainee
is a much less serious offender than the marginal prisoner in the
criminal justice system[,]" even when the immigrant detainee is
detained based on a program intended to target the most serious
immigrant criminal offenders. 142 If undocumented immigrants
committed serious crimes at much higher levels than other populations,
there should have been a correlated decrease in the rate of serious
crime. However, the lack of such correlation suggests that
undocumented immigrants commit serious crimes at lower levels than
native-born individuals.
In addition, the AIC report uses epidemiological data to examine
the likelihood of immigrants versus native-born citizens to engage in
criminal behavior. A 2014 study examining violent and/or nonviolent
antisocial behavior found that immigrants in the United States were
much less likely than native-born Americans to engage in that type of
behavior. 143 In fact, native-born Americans were three times more
likely than immigrants from Latin America and four times more likely
than immigrants from Asia or Africa "to report violent behavior." 144
When looking at "high risk" adolescents over almost a decade, another
2014 study focusing on adolescent health found that immigrants were
less likely than native-born young people to be repeat offenders of a
serious offense.1 45 Taken together, this range of studies shows that the
1'
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immigration status of a person itself does not increase the likelihood of
criminality and thus does not pose a threat to an officer during a stop.
Critics may argue that any percentage of the immigrant population
that are criminals should allow law enforcement to treat the whole
population as a safety risk. From efficiency and from community
policing perspectives, this viewpoint makes little sense. An
examination of the "Stop and Frisk" program utilized by New York
City, and similar programs in other cities, provides a useful analogy of
the perils of assigning criminality to a group as a whole.
Terry v. Ohio1 4 6 validated the practice of stop and frisk when the
Court held that if an officer has reasonable suspicion that a suspect
was involved in serious criminal conduct and that he or she is "armed
and dangerous," the officer may pat down or "frisk" the suspect. 147 Since
that ruling, law enforcement has greatly expanded its power of stop
and frisk to encompass all suspected criminal activity, regardless of
how trivial, and "under circumstances where the conduct observed may
be fully consistent with innocence." 148 The New York Police Department
(NYPD) in particular has come under significant scrutiny for its use of
stop and frisk, which the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) has
tracked since 2002.
At the height of stop and frisk in 2011, the NYPD stopped New
Yorkers 685,724 times, but 88 percent of the individuals (605,328) were
found to be completely innocent. 149 Of particular concern is the fact that
young black men made up 25.6 percent of NYPD stops despite
comprising only 1.9 percent of the city's population, and young Latino
men made up 16.0 percent of NYPD stops despite comprising only 2.8
percent of the city's population. 150 In addition, black and Latino New
Yorkers were more likely to be frisked than their white counterparts,
yet they were less likely to be found with a weapon.15 1 Not only does
stop and frisk come under scrutiny for racial discrimination, the data
also shows that the practice does not effectively stop or deter crime.
Examining the 4.4 million stop-and-frisk encounters between January
2004 and June 2012, of the 52 percent of stops that were followed by a

146

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New
York City, 162 U. PA. L. REv. ONLINE 117, 118 (2013).
148 Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75,
(2002)).
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frisk for weapons, a weapon was found in only 1.5 percent of those
frisks. 152 In other words, 98.5 percent of the time, no weapon was
found.153
The stop-and-frisk data illustrates the problem when law
enforcement assigns wholesale criminality to a particular populationin this case, blacks and Latinos. Based on the data provided earlier
that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes, an important
corollary can be made: law enforcement should not assign criminality to
this population simply because of their immigration status. Given that,
as a whole, immigrants are not likely to be more dangerous than the
native-born population, they pose no greater risk to officers during a
traffic stop. Thus, courts should not consider checking a suspect's
immigration status as part of the mission of a stop.
B.

The Risk of Increasing Racial Profiling Allegations when Checking
Immigration Status During a Stop

Even though immigration violations are crimes and thus fit within
the Government's endeavor to deter crime in general, most immigration
infractions are civil in nature. Unless the officer has reasonable
suspicion that the person committed the felony of illegally reentering
the United States after being deported, 154 or some other type of more
serious immigration crime (for example, human trafficking), 15 1 it would
be difficult to articulate what the reasonable suspicion of
undocumented status would be, e.g., would an immigration check be
triggered by a suspect's accent, skin color, or type of clothing? More
likely than not, these questions would raise allegations of racial
profiling. Although the Court in Whren held that the motive of police is
immaterial to the validity of a stop, even accusations of racial profiling
could lead to mistrust between the community and law enforcement. In
addition, the officer could open herself up to questions of whether she
was prolonging the traffic stop to conduct an immigration check once
the checks related to the traffic violation have been completed.
Some anecdotal evidence suggests that local police check
immigration status after the mission of the stop has been completed
and base their decisions on racial profiling, rather than reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. A troubling internal email from a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attorney recently raised

15
Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of A Violent
Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 849, 857 (2014) (citing Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
" Id.
154
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
155
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questions as to the extent of ethnic and racial profiling used by local
police when interacting with immigrants. 156 According to the email,
Louisiana police detained two Honduran men waiting for a ride to their
construction jobs on loitering charges because they looked Latino.15 7
Although the two men were not charged with any crimes, the local
police nevertheless transferred them to DHS, which detained them
because they are unauthorized immigrants who had been previously
deported.15 8 Despite the Obama Administration's focus on keeping
families together and deporting only the most serious criminals, a DHS
official expressed concern that "[t]he men appear to have been arrested,
transported and detained for an extended period of time, without any
local law-enforcement interest in charging them with a crime, solely for
an immigration status check." 159 Local police claimed that the men
were not singled out for being Latino but because they were standing in
a location where people were known to loiter and use drugs.1 60
Nevertheless, Homeland Security officials continue to be apprehensive
that local police are using stops to racially profile individuals suspected
of being in this country illegally.161 If that is in fact the case, this could
be an example of where Arizona v. United States and Rodriguez
intersect.
While the Border Patrol is generally responsible for enforcing
immigration laws at the border of the United States, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for enforcing immigration
laws within the nation's interior. 162 Under Section 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, non-federal officers aid ICE in its
federal immigration enforcement.163 Under the 287(g) program, state
and local law enforcement receive delegated authority to enforce
immigration laws by entering into a partnership with ICE under a joint

Joseph Tanfani & Brian Bennett, Homeland Security Email Points to Ongoing Racial
Profiling by Local Police, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-borderprofiling-20 151015-story.html [https://perma.cc/X3KV-JNSJ].
157 Id.
1'8 The Editorial Board, Editorial, Wrongly Profiled and Deported, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015),
http: lwww.nytimes.com/20 15/10/24/opinion/wrongly-profiled-and-deported.
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A556-G8UE].
'9 Id. The two individuals featured in this article were subject to removal orders because they
had been previously removed and thus still met the second priority for deportation under the
Priority Enforcement Program. Jose Adan Fugon-Cano was deported and Gustavo BarahonSanchez is expected to be deported imminently (as of October 2015).
116
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16
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012).

IMMIGRATION CHECKS AFTER RODRIGUEZ

907]

927

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).1 64 Even without an MOA, local and
state law enforcement may "cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not
lawfully present." 165
From October 2008 until November 2014, the Secure Communities
Program (S-COMM) aided ICE in its efforts to detect and deport
undocumented immigrants present in the United States, with the
overall purported goal of "keep[ing] communities safer from violent
crime." 1 6 6 S-COMM required local and state law enforcement to share
the biometric data of anyone arrested with federal authorities; ICE
would then submit detainer requests to local authorities to hold
individuals it believed to be in the United States illegally until the
agency could pick them up to place them in removal proceedings.1 67
Based on criticism that S-COMM was misunderstood by state and local
entities and that it led to the detainment of vulnerable populations and
U.S. citizens, DHS announced that it would end the program and
replace it with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). PEP focuses
on detaining and removing only those undocumented immigrants who
pose a national security threat or were convicted of specific enumerated
crimes.' 68
As stated earlier, the Arizona v. United States Court expressed
caution that the constitutionality of the S.B. 1070 provision would be
questioned if individuals were detained solely to verify their
immigration status. 169 Although officers like the ones in Louisiana
could claim that they did not stop individuals only to check their
immigration status, they could still be violating Rodriguez if the
immigration check prolonged the stop once the mission of the stop (e.g.,
investigating the loitering violation) had been completed or if the Court
definitely decides that immigration status is unrelated to the mission of
a stop.1 70 If the Court undertakes the latter action, allegations of racial
profiling would be reduced because there would not even be a pretext as
suggested by the defendants in Whren that the officer was stopping an
individual because of suspected undocumented status.
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Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
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Critics of this approach to searches may assert that an immigrant
choosing not to disclose her immigration status does not have a
"legitimate interest in privacy," and thus official conduct determining
an individual's immigration status is not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment.1 71 Relatedly, the Court has "held that any interest in
possessing contraband cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus,
governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband
'compromises no legitimate privacy interest."' 172 In addition, for states
that prohibit undocumented immigrants from applying for driver's
licenses, it is plausible that that population either drives without a
license or procures fraudulent identification (either by buying a stolen
identity or counterfeiting documents). Regardless of whether the holder
of this type of identification is undocumented or not, such individual
would in fact be in possession of contraband.
However, it is a stretch to conflate one's immigration status with
contraband. In the immigration context, the interest of the otherwise
law-abiding immigrant in not disclosing her immigration status is
fundamentally different from the contraband arguments. While ICE
and Border Patrol agents have authority to question individuals on
their immigration status, 173 different jurisdictions have different rules
as to whether an individual is required to disclose her immigration
status to local and state law enforcement. In jurisdictions where local
and state law enforcement have entered into 287(g) agreements with
ICE, those officers can perform certain functions of an immigration
officer. Under those circumstances, an individual may have to disclose
her immigration status to the local or state officer.
On the other hand, New York City passed an executive ordinance
that included immigration status under the umbrella of confidential
information that cannot be disclosed by any city officer or employee,
unless the individual is suspected by an officer of engaging in illegal
activity, other than mere status as an undocumented immigrant.1 7 4 In
addition, law enforcement officers may not inquire about an
individual's immigration status unless they are investigating illegal
activity other than mere status as an undocumented immigrant.1 75 For
example, if an undocumented immigrant is not the target of a criminal
investigation but rather is assisting law enforcement in the

minois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 123 (1984)).
172 Id. (emphasis in original).
173 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)-(c) (2012).
174
New York City Exec. Order No. 41, Office of the Mayor of New York (Sept. 17, 2003),
171
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investigation, she should not have to fear that her immigration status
will be revealed in the process of interacting with the New York Police
Department.
C.

Policy Recommendations May Alleviate Allegations of Racial
Profiling During a Law Enforcement Stop

This Comment contends that the Supreme Court should extend
Rodriguez to hold that checking an individual's immigration status is
unrelated to the "mission" of the stop and thus should not be conducted
after the stop is completed. If the Supreme Court chooses not to clarify
the reach of Rodriguez in the immigration context, the legislative and
executive branches could take indirect action to rein in officers who use
law enforcement stops as a pretext to check an individual's immigration
status.
Congress should pass comprehensive immigration reform, because
it would allow undocumented people currently living in fear to come
forward without fear of deportation. For example, the comprehensive
bill passed by the Senate in 2013 ("S. 744") would have *allowed
undocumented individuals to apply for legalized status and eventually
earn a path to citizenship, in addition to deterring future unauthorized
immigration. 176 The Congressional Budget Office calculated that of the
estimated 11.5 million undocumented immigrants in the United States
in 2011, approximately 8 million individuals in that population would
obtain legal status under S. 744.177 If undocumented immigrants are

given the opportunity to legalize their status, they will have less fear of
interacting with law enforcement. In addition, officers may be less
likely to assume that someone speaking with an accent or someone
with darker skin is in the United States without legal status,
depending on how effective and how broad a path to citizenship would
be, and how successful deterrence of future unauthorized immigration
would be.

"1 See generally Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
171
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However, without a bright-line rule from the Court or an explicit
legislative provision clarifying that immigration status is unrelated to
the mission of a stop and cannot be used to prolong a stop,
comprehensive immigration reform is not a panacea. The End Racial
Profiling Act (ERPA) is an example of such a legislative provision.
Lawmakers have introduced ERPA in every Congress since 2001.178 As
introduced in the 114th Congress, the bill would prohibit any law
enforcement officer or agency (federal, state, and local) from engaging
in racial profiling.1 79 The bill would incentivize state and local law
enforcement agencies applying for certain federal law enforcement
grants to certify that they maintain adequate policies and procedures
for eliminating racial profiling and have eliminated any existing
practices that permit or encourage racial profiling. 18 0 More narrowly,
Congress could also enact a bill with respect to racial profiling within
the immigration context. For example, S. 744 had a provision
prohibiting federal officers from using race or ethnicity to inform
routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions in any capacity
unless a specific description of the suspect exists. 181
Finally, the Department of Justice could update its racial profiling
guidance to include certain DHS actions and local and state law
enforcement activities. In December 2014, the Obama administration
updated the initial guidance issued in 2003 by Attorney General John
Ashcroft. 182 In addition to banning profiling based on race and
ethnicity, the revised rules ban profiling based on religion, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity. 183 The guidance
1
also bans the use of racial profiling in the national security context, 84
except when screening airline passengers or guarding the Southern
border. 185 However, the guidance does not apply to local or state law
enforcement, potentially allowing those entities to racially profile
individuals during law enforcement stops.

See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001); End Racial Profiling
Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001).
17.
End Racial Profiling Act of 2015, S. 1056, 114th Cong. (2015).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Immigration enforcement has perplexed the United States for
decades. Enforcement is spread out among several federal agencies, in
addition to the 287(g) agreements that allow local and state law
enforcement to partake in administering immigration law. As a result,
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment during traffic stops and
Terry stops play an important role in determining the limits for law
enforcement. Furthermore, federal priorities are often at odds with
local and state priorities, including situations where the current
administration is criticized simultaneously for being too lax and too
harsh on enforcement.
Although Rodriguez v. United States addressed the dog-sniff
searches during a stop, it also has important implications for
immigration enforcement. While the Court held that an officer may
conduct unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful stop, she may not
do so in such a way that it extends the length of the stop, absent the
reasonable suspicion typically required to justify detaining a suspect.
Circuit Courts have already applied Rodriguez to cases beyond dog-sniff
searches.
Within this construct, immigration status should be considered
unrelated to the mission of the stop and thus law enforcement should
not be allowed to conduct an immigration check if it extends the length
of a traffic or Terry stop. Following this guideline would provide a
bright-line rule for local and state law enforcement who may not be as
well-versed in the complexities of immigration law. In addition, this
clear-cut rule would provide a shield against allegations of ethnic or
racial profiling perpetrated by law enforcement. Although Congress
may pass comprehensive immigration reform and/or the Department of
Justice may update its racial profiling guidance, the Supreme Court
should nonetheless address future cases of immigration status checks
within the context of Rodriguez. The Court is the most appropriate
avenue for this change within current Fourth Amendment precedent.

